Last data update: May 06, 2024. (Total: 46732 publications since 2009)
Records 1-6 (of 6 Records) |
Query Trace: McCarty CL[original query] |
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Identifying and addressing the daily needs of contacts of an Ebola patient during investigation, monitoring, and movement restriction, Ohio
McCarty CL , Karwowski MP , Basler C , Erme M , Kippes C , Quinn K , de Fijter S , DiOrio C , Braden C , Knust B , Santibañez S . Public Health Rep 2016 131 (5) 661-665 An essential element of Ebola control involves monitoring and movement restrictions for people who come into contact with an Ebola patient while the patient is infectious. Although procedures can vary by local regulations, monitoring and movement restrictions for Ebola contacts normally last for 21 days after the last exposure to the infectious patient. Contact monitoring and movement restrictions allow for early identification of disease to prevent further transmission.1 However, movement restrictions also limit a contact’s ability to meet some of his or her own daily living needs. Ensuring that measures and processes are in place to provide for these needs is an important component of implementing movement restrictions. Stigmatization of contacts because of community fears creates an additional need for supports.2 A previous report of a related Ebola investigation in Texas described the needs of Ebola contacts, including basic needs for food, financial assistance, and education. In that investigation, health officials found that meeting the needs of Ebola contacts was essential to successful contact monitoring.3 | Providing for the daily needs of people whose movement is restricted during an outbreak response is not new to public health. This need was noted during the typhus and cholera epidemics in New York City in 18924 and during the severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic in Taiwan and Canada in 2013, where affected individuals experienced uncomfortable surroundings, discrimination, uncertainty, and a need for family support.5,6 We discuss the importance of preparing for such daily needs and how the Ebola experience in Ohio adds to the Texas report to inform future situations in which movement restrictions are needed. |
Community needs assessment after microcystin toxin contamination of a municipal water supply - Lucas County, Ohio, September 2014
McCarty CL , Nelson L , Eitniear S , Zgodzinski E , Zabala A , Billing L , DiOrio M . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2016 65 (35) 925-929 On August 1, 2014, routine testing at the Collins Park Water Treatment Plant in Lucas County, Ohio, revealed microcystin toxin levels in drinking water had reached 3.19 mug/L, surpassing the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) drinking water advisory threshold of 1.0 mug/L. Microcystin is a hepatoxin released by cyanobacteria in certain harmful algal blooms. Exposure to microcystin has been associated with gastrointestinal and hepatic illness in both humans and animals (1-3). On August 2, a do-not-drink advisory was issued, warning community members not to drink, boil, or use the water for cooking or brushing teeth. Public health officials used traditional and social media outlets to disseminate public health messages to affected communities. On August 4, 2014, the advisory was lifted after multiple water samples confirmed microcystin toxin levels had dropped below the advisory threshold. To assess communication strategies, water exposure, and household needs, the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) and Toledo-Lucas County Health Department (TLCHD) conducted a Community Assessment for Public Health Emergency Response (CASPER) in Lucas County. Most households (88.1%) reported hearing about the advisory the morning it was issued, but 11% reported drinking and 21% reported brushing teeth with municipal water during the advisory. Household members reported physical (16%) and mental (10%) health concerns that they believed were related to the advisory and activity disruptions including temporarily staying outside of the home (6%) during the advisory and continued use of alternative water sources after the advisory was lifted (82%). During a do-not-drink advisory, governmental agencies and community partners need to engage in joint prevention and response efforts to decrease water exposure and prevent activity disruptions. |
Increases in fentanyl-related overdose deaths - Florida and Ohio, 2013-2015
Peterson AB , Gladden RM , Delcher C , Spies E , Garcia-Williams A , Wang Y , Halpin J , Zibbell J , McCarty CL , DeFiore-Hyrmer J , DiOrio M , Goldberger BA . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2016 65 (33) 844-849 In March and October 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and CDC issued nationwide alerts identifying fentanyl, particularly illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF), as a threat to public health and safety (1,2). IMF is pharmacologically similar to pharmaceutical fentanyl (PF), but is unlawfully produced in clandestine laboratories, obtained via illicit drug markets, and includes fentanyl analogs. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid 50-100 times more potent than morphine and approved for the management of surgical/postoperative pain, severe chronic pain, and breakthrough cancer pain.* DEA's National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS) collects drug identification results from drug cases analyzed by federal, state, and local forensic laboratories throughout the United States.dagger In 2014, 80% of fentanyl submissions (i.e., drug products obtained by law enforcement that tested positive for fentanyl) in NFLIS were identified from 10 states, including Florida and Ohio (2), and seven of these 10 states reported sharp increases in fentanyl-related overdose deaths (fentanyl deaths) (3). This report presents findings of increased fentanyl deaths during 2013-2015 from investigations conducted by the University of Florida and the Ohio Department of Public Health, in collaboration with CDC. Analyses examined the association between trends in fentanyl-related law enforcement submissions and fentanyl deaths and describes groups at risk for fentanyl death using medical examiner and coroner reports. The marked increases in fentanyl death in Florida and Ohio during 2013-2015 were closely associated with parallel increases in fentanyl submissions, with the largest impact on persons who use heroin, consistent with reports that IMF is commonly mixed with or sold as heroin (1,4). In Ohio, circumstances associated with fentanyl deaths included a current diagnosed mental health disorder section sign and recent release from an institution such as a jail, rehabilitation facility, or hospital. |
Notes from the field: large outbreak of botulism associated with a church potluck meal - Ohio, 2015
McCarty CL , Angelo K , Beer KD , Cibulskas-White K , Quinn K , Fijter S , Bokanyi R , Germain ES , Baransi K , Barlow K , Shafer G , Hanna L , Spindler K , Walz E , DiOrio M , Jackson BR , Luquez C , Mahon BE , Basler C , Curran K , Matanock A , Walsh K , Slifka KJ , Rao AK . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2015 64 (29) 802-803 On April 21, 2015, the Fairfield Medical Center (FMC) and Fairfield Department of Health contacted the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) about a patient suspected of having botulism in Fairfield County, Ohio. Botulism is a severe, potentially fatal neuroparalytic illness.* A single case is a public health emergency, because it can signal an outbreak. Within 2 hours of health department notification, four more patients with similar clinical features arrived at FMC's emergency department. Later that afternoon, one patient died of respiratory failure shortly after arriving at the emergency department. All affected persons had eaten at the same widely attended church potluck meal on April 19. CDC's Strategic National Stockpile sent 50 doses of botulinum antitoxin to Ohio. FMC, the Fairfield Department of Health, ODH, and CDC rapidly responded to confirm the diagnosis, identify and treat additional patients, and determine the source. |
Public health response to commercial airline travel of a person with Ebola virus infection - United States, 2014
Regan JJ , Jungerman R , Montiel SH , Newsome K , Objio T , Washburn F , Roland E , Petersen E , Twentyman E , Olaiya O , Naughton M , Alvarado-Ramy F , Lippold SA , Tabony L , McCarty CL , Kinsey CB , Barnes M , Black S , Azzam I , Stanek D , Sweitzer J , Valiani A , Kohl KS , Brown C , Pesik N . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2015 64 (3) 63-6 Before the current Ebola epidemic in West Africa, there were few documented cases of symptomatic Ebola patients traveling by commercial airline, and no evidence of transmission to passengers or crew members during airline travel. In July 2014 two persons with confirmed Ebola virus infection who were infected early in the Nigeria outbreak traveled by commercial airline while symptomatic, involving a total of four flights (two international flights and two Nigeria domestic flights). It is not clear what symptoms either of these two passengers experienced during flight; however, one collapsed in the airport shortly after landing, and the other was documented to have fever, vomiting, and diarrhea on the day the flight arrived. Neither infected passenger transmitted Ebola to other passengers or crew on these flights. In October 2014, another airline passenger, a U.S. health care worker who had traveled domestically on two commercial flights, was confirmed to have Ebola virus infection. Given that the time of onset of symptoms was uncertain, an Ebola airline contact investigation in the United States was conducted. In total, follow-up was conducted for 268 contacts in nine states, including all 247 passengers from both flights, 12 flight crew members, eight cleaning crew members, and one federal airport worker (81 of these contacts were documented in a report published previously). All contacts were accounted for by state and local jurisdictions and followed until completion of their 21-day incubation periods. No secondary cases of Ebola were identified in this investigation, confirming that transmission of Ebola during commercial air travel did not occur. |
Response to importation of a case of Ebola virus disease - Ohio, October 2014
McCarty CL , Basler C , Karwowski M , Erme M , Nixon G , Kippes C , Allan T , Parrilla T , DiOrio M , Fijter Sd , Stone ND , Yost DA , Lippold SA , Regan JJ , Honein MA , Knust B , Braden C . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2014 63 (46) 1089-91 On September 30, 2014, the Texas Department of State Health Services reported a case of Ebola virus disease (Ebola) diagnosed in Dallas, Texas, and confirmed by CDC, the first case of Ebola diagnosed in the United States. The patient (patient 1) had traveled from Liberia, a country which, along with Sierra Leone and Guinea, is currently experiencing the largest recorded Ebola outbreak. A nurse (patient 2) who provided hospital bedside care to patient 1 in Texas visited an emergency department (ED) with fever and was diagnosed with laboratory-confirmed Ebola on October 11, and a second nurse (patient 3) who also provided hospital bedside care visited an ED with fever and rash on October 14 and was diagnosed with laboratory-confirmed Ebola on October 15. Patient 3 visited Ohio during October 10-13, traveling by commercial airline between Dallas, Texas, and Cleveland, Ohio. Based on the medical history and clinical and laboratory findings on October 14, the date of illness onset was uncertain; therefore, CDC, in collaboration with state and local partners, included the period October 10-13 as being part of the potentially infectious period, out of an abundance of caution to ensure all potential contacts were monitored. On October 15, the Ohio Department of Health requested CDC assistance to identify and monitor contacts of patient 3, assess the risk for disease transmission, provide infection control recommendations, and assess and guide regional health care system preparedness. The description of this contact investigation and hospital assessment is provided to help other states in planning for similar events. |
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